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IN TiiE SUPREME COURT 
OF TiiE STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF SOUTH OGDEN, a Utah 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
V'S. Case No. 16903 
KAYJI OKA and RUTH OKA, 
his wife, 
Defendants-Respondents 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is concerned with a determination of whether 
certain admitted facts, together with allegations and admissions 
in thepleading~can justify a ruling that the plaintiff in a 
condemnation action acquired possession of a property under 
the provisions of Section 78-34-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
(as amended 1967), so as to justify the running of statutory 
interest on the final award, even though no formal Order of 
Occupancy was secured by the plaintiff condenmor. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower Court ruled that defendant condeemnees were 
entitled to receive interest on the stipulated agreed value 
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of the property condemned and taken from and after the 
date of the filing of the Answer to plaintiff's Complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
These defendants seek to have this Court affirm the 
Judgment, including interest, as awarded by the lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant has generally recited the skeletal facts 
setting forth the procedural sequence of the litigation; 
however, respondents do not agree with appellant's statement 
that it did not ". . . ever enter or take actual possession ... " 
of the condemned properties, ·since the quoted phrase raises 
the mixed issue of fact and law which was before the lower 
Court and which is the subject of this appeal. Further, as 
this argument proceeds, it will be necessary to add a few 
additional supplemental facts in order to more clearly explain 
what events transpired between the time the Complaint 
was filed and when the matter was brought before the lower Cour 
at the time of the Pre-Trial hearing. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
POSSESSION OF THE CONDE}1NED PROPERTIES WAS 
SURRENDERED TO PlAINTIFF AT TIIE TIME TIIE 
ANSWER TO TIIE COMPlAINT WAS SERVED. 
In condemnation actions under Utah law the value of 
real property taken for public use is determined as of the 
date of the Service of Summons: 
"78-34-11-- When right to damages deemed to have accrued--
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, 
the right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at 
the date of the service of sunnnons, and its actual 
value at that date shall be the measure of compensation 
for all property to be actually taken, ... " 
Although the foregoing statute fixes the valuation date, 
interest on the value of the ~roperty taken begins to run from 
the date the condemner takes actual possession of the property 
or secures an order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, as 
provided in a companion portion of the Code: 
" 78-34-9-- Occupancy of premises pending action--
Deposit paid into court-- Procedure for pavment of 
compensation.-- ... and the said judgment shall 
include, as part of the just compensation awarded, 
interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the amount 
finally awarded as the value of the property and 
damages, from the date of taking actual possession 
thereof by the plaintiff or order of occupancy, 
whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment; ... " 
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In this case South Ogden City corrnnenced condemnation 
proceedings to acquire vacant land for a new City building 
complex. Rather than serve the Complaint through normal 
channels, counsel for defendan~ accepted service of the 
Complaint ( R. 6), and simultaneously served an Answer ( R.5) 
on plaintiff's attorney. 'IbeCornplaint contained a special 
prayer for relief in the following terms: 
" Plaintiff further prays for an Order authorizing 
immediate occupancy of the described premises for 
the purpose of commencing construction." ( R. 2) 
In addition, the Complaint incorporated therein 
Exhibit "A", which was the Resolution of the City Council 
authorizing its attorney to proceed with the matter and to--
"3. To obtain from said Court, an Order permitting the 
City to take irrnnediate possession and use of said real 
property, ... " ( R.3) 
On October 27, 197 8, shortly after receiving the Complaint, 
defendants' attorney filed and served an Answer admitting the 
entire Complaint, but setting up the issue of the valuation of 
the property taken: 
" 1. Defendants admit 
7, and 8. 
paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6, 
"2. Defendants deny that plaintiff has offered to them 
an amount of money which represents just compensation 
for the properties being condemned." 
( R. 5) 
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Further, the prayer for relief included in the An~-;·,.;,·r 
affirmatively sought relief for interest in addition to the 
fair market value of the lands being taken, in the following 
statement: 
" together with interest thereon from the date of 
the acceptance of service of Summons on October 25, 1978, 
at the rate of 8% per annum, both before and after 
judgment, until paid, ... " ( R. 5) 
Relying on plaintiff's representations in the pleadings 
that it required immediate occupancy of the lands to commence 
construction, defendan~ immediately abandoned and surrendered 
the property to the City and discontinued any further use of 
"J'c 
it ( R. 25), a representation to the lower Court which was not 
disputed by plaintiff. In fact, the subject land is directly 
across the street from the present City offices ( R. 26)~ How-
ever, the plans for the City complex were not finished and, 
as it developed, the delay was rather extensive ( R. 26): 
The matter was set for Pre-Trial on November 19, 1979, 
at which time the issue -0f whether plaintiff should pay interest 
on any award from the date of acceptance of service of Summons 
and Complaint arose. At the time it was agreed that the fair 
market value of the property would be determined as of October 27, 
1978, when acceptance of Service became effective, and in fact 
* Ibese page references are found in the Record of South Ogden 
City v. Fujiki-- Case No. 16902. 
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the parties did subsequently agree as to the fair market value 
of the property taken. 
At the Pre-Trial hearing plaintiff initially contended 
that it was necessary for an Order of Occupancy to issue before 
* interest would run on any award ( R.26-27) , but subsequently 
attempted to convince the lower Court that it had not acquired 
actual possession of the property-- contending, as its argument 
developed in substance, that " actual" possession of the property 
should be synonymous with going on the property and taking 
" physical" possession. After argument on the matter the lower 
Court issued its ruling as follows: 
OGDEN, UTAH NOVEMBER 19, 1979 11:30 A.M. 
TIIE COURT: The Court will rule as follows: That in this 
Complaint there was an order-- that there was a Complaint filed 
alleging a need for and praying for immediate possession of the 
properties, and also alleging that they would be offered a 
reasonable sum. The Answer denies that they have been offered 
a reasonable sum, but admits all other pleadings. 
The property apparently is truck farm property. 
MR. STINE: Subdivision lots, if the Court please, that's 
* These page references are found in the Record of South Ogden 
City v. Fujiki-- Case No. 16902. 
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THE COURT: Subdivision? 
MR. FULLER: Tile highest and best use would be sub-
division, but I think it had been used for crop farming. 
THE COURT: 1be only practical use since the Summons 
was made would not be-- no one can very well use it for a 
subdivision. 
MR. STINE: The highest and best use-- wasn't it zoned 
for a duplex at the time-- it's residential subdivision. Tiley 
had truck farmed it, row cropped it from time to time. 
THE COURT: The Court will deem that the state of the 
pleadings substantially destroys the value of the property, 
and that if the city goes through, they'll have to pay interest--
MR. STINE: From the date of--
THE COURT: -- from the date of the Summons-- from the 
date of the Answer when-- as soon as you knew that there wasn't 
any issue on it. 
MR. STINE: From the date of the Answer? 
THE COURT: That' s right. " 
THE COURT: Okay. It is the date of theAnswer; as soon 
as they knew there was no issue andthe possession could have 
lawfully been taken any time they wanted to from then on. Tiie 
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value of the property as subdivision property had been 
destroyed for the landowner's µirposes. Possession has been 
taken in the holding of the ground. That is the ruling of the 
Court." ( See R. 21-22) 
If defendants had retained possession and the use of the 
property after connnencement of the action, there would be a 
logical argument that the constitutional mandate of paying 
just compensation would be satisfied, and several Utah cases 
so hold. However, under the facts of this case, where the 
pleadings emphatically recited the irrrrnediate need for occupancy 
of the premises, and where defendants irrnnediately surrendered 
and abandoned the property to the City, it would indeed appear 
un reasonable to require the property owners to forebear both 
the use of their property and the alternative right to recover 
interest on its value simply because South Ogden City sub-
sequently realized that there would be delays in getting its 
building plans prepared. Certainly, the Complaint and its 
attached Exhibit clearly indicated that the City was ready to 
go and that it wanted the property immediately. Under the 
circumstances, securing a formal Order of Occupancy was totally 
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unnecessary. 
Plaintiff had possession of the subject property as of 
October 27,1978, within the meaning of Section 78-34-9. 
Plaintiff cites several Utah cases in support of its 
position that interest is not allowable under the facts of this 
case, but each and every cited case is inapposite; rather, a 
careful reading of the cases supports the lower Court's ruling 
that interest should be paid on the award under the facts of 
this case. In Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 
80 Pac. 732, an award of interest was denied where the property 
owner retained both possession and use of the condemned premises. 
But in that case, contrary to the facts before this Court, it 
was held that the condemner-- " . . . did not ask for and did not 
have possession of said lots, ... " before trial; and" Nor 
was there any time when it could have taken possession and 
given a writ of assistance therefore until final judgment and 
Order of Condemnation." Further, the Court stated that" ... 
Tile condemner is not required to make that compensation, until 
he does take, either actual or constructively." 
Plaintiff also cites State v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P.2d 
630 and State v. Bettilvon, Inc., 17 U. 2d 135, 405 P.2d 420, 
but neither case supports plaintiff's position. Peek recognizes 
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that a taking occurs" ... when the possession of the property 
is actually surrendered, ... "and Bettilyon recognizes that 
interest accrues" ... from the time of actual taking of 
. " possession ... 
To paraphrase plaintiff's argument in its brief, 
plaintiff had actual possession of the subject property both 
in " fact" and in " reality". ( Br. 7) In weighing the equities 
of this case, plaintiff ought to pay interest on the total award 
from the time the property was abandoned and surrendered to the 
City. 
3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 8.63 states that--
" ... the right to interest from the time that payment 
ought to have been made until it is actually made 
follows as a matter of strict constitutional right." 
Similarly, in the case of State of Oregon, by and 
through its D 0 T v. Glenn ( 1979), 602 P. 2d 253, that Court, 
interpreting a Constitutional provision similar to that of 
Article I,Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, stated: 
"Prior decisions of this Court have explained that 
the interest award is part of the ' just compensation' 
required by Article I,Section 18 of the Oregon 
Constitution." 
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POINT II 
IBE CONSTITUTIONAL ~1.\NDATE REQUIRING PAY:lENT 
OF J1JST COMPENSATION SHOULD NOT BE CIRCUM-
VENTED BY TECHNICAL PROCEDURAL MANEUVERS 
During recent years we have experienced an explosive growth 
along the Wasatch Front in northern Utah, one of the results being 
reflected in a substantial amount of condemnation activity. Not 
all property owners have converted their lands from an established 
use, such as row-crop farming as exists in this case, so as to take 
irmnediate advantage of higher and better uses which have developed 
in different localities. Property owners have found that they can 
continue farming a tract of land, even though it is ripe for sub-
division development as here, and that the farming activities will 
produce a given economic return and yet allow the owner to hold 
on to the property for a sufficient period of time as will reflect 
higher values over the years due to population pressures and the 
effect of inflation. 
On the other ham , by retaining properties and not 
immediately converting them to the highest use to which they 
are adaptable at a given time, such open lands are fair game for 
condenming agencies seeking sites for highways, public buildings, 
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schools and the like. In fact, it is easy to see why condemners 
might try to tie up such properties in advance of actual 
public needs so as to head off any development of such unim-
proved lands. In this case, the lands being taken had value 
because a subdivider would have purchased them on the date of 
the service of Summons for tre purpose of constructing single 
family residences and duplexes in accordance with South Ogden 
City zoning. As Judge Wahlquist recognized, the filing of the 
Complaint effectivelycestroyed the highest and best use of 
the subject property. 
As a result of the foregoing situation, there has devel-
oped an interesting and generally effective procedural tactic 
on the part of some condemners whereby a property owner can 
effectively be denied the recovery of just compensation under 
the mandate of Article I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution 
by maneuvering within the framework of Sections 78-34-11 and 
78-34-9. Here is the way it works: The condemn.or files and 
serves its Complaint, thereby establishing a valuation date 
for the property taken; however, to avoid the running of interest, 
it does not seek an order of immediate occupancy. Unless brought 
into Court on a motion seeking to dismiss the proceedings or force 
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actual t~king of possession ( which is no certain re~edy for 
the landowner in any event), the condemnor will often do nothing 
until the condemnee forces the matter to trial. Titis strategy is 
being used more and more in an era of rapidly rising land prices, 
as we have been experiencing in the past few years. 
It is understandable that a condemnor might move as rapidly 
as possible to file and serve its complaint so as to head off 
rising land prices, but to also attempt to avoid the payment of 
interest or to recognize ever increasing land values up to the 
time of actual trial often borders on unconscionable conduct. 
Even if, as here, the statutory rate of interest at 8% per annum 
is awarded to the property owner, this is far short of constitutional 
just compensation where one nrust accept market values at the date 
of the service of summons and complaint (plus 8% interest), when 
in fact the market conditions are moving along at an incremental 
rate of between 15% and 20% per annum, as was the situation in 
South Ogden during 1978 and 1979. 
Appellant seeks both to freeze market values in this case 
as of October 27, 1978, and to deny either statutory interest 
at 8% per annum or the alternative greater per annum increase in 
the market value of the subject properties from and after that date. 
'Ille only excuse it can make is that, when it alleged in its 
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Complaint and Resolution that it needed irmnediate occupancy 
to commence construction it really didn't mean what it claimed. 
Appellant's actions do not square with its argument to this 
Court. 
In response to a somewhat similar situation in the case of 
Kimball v. Salt LakeCity, ~2, U. 253, 90 Pac. 395, which 
involved a condenmation proceeding for damages and interest 
resulting from a change of the grade of a street in front of a 
residence ( brought under Utah Constitution Article I,Sec. 22), 
our Court reflected: 
" The adherence to precedent is no doubt a commendable 
judicial virtue, but, if carried to extremes, may 
easily, like most virtues, border upon vice. The law 
as declared by the Courts should not be permitted to 
prevail against valid statutory enactments, and should 
in no event curtail or minimize constitutional provisions." 
( Emphasis added) 
Appellate courts should ever be mindful of applying 
existing statutory and case law to ever changing conditions, 
particularly when new and unusual factual developments 
permeating an economy must be considered and grappled with. 
This case presents a situation requiring a logical and practical 
application of the law and facts to the realities of modern 
times. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's abortive attempt to play hop scotch within 
the statutory framework cannot prevail against the superior 
and overriding mandate of the Utah Constitution requiring pay-
ment of just compensation to property owners who must un-
willingly give up their lands through no fault of their own. 
Of all legal areas involving court action, the field of eminent 
domain should not be one where games are played. '!be lower 
Court accurately analyzed the situation for what it actually 
was, and ruled accordingly. 
'Ibis matter was previously presented to this Court by 
plaintiff on a Motion For Sunnnary Reversal of Judgment, pursuant 
to Rule 73 B, UtahRules of Civil Procedure, and was orally argued 
on April 7, 1980; and the Motion was denied on the same date. 
Plaintiff in pursuing this appeal has added little or nothing to 
what it presented in its Motion, and it would appear that this 
so-called Appeal is nothing more than a re-submission of the 
Motion which was denied. 'Ibe procedure being followed by plaintiff, 
even if within the framework of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, certainly does not appear to comport with the spirit 
and intent of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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The Judgment of the lower Court awarding interest on the 
stipulated award from and after the date of the service of the 
Answer on October 2 7, 197 8, should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER 
678 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Defendants-Responde~ 
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